MindaNews
Sunday, 25 May 2008 17:10
DAVAO CITY (MindaNews/24 May) – Moro leader Nur Misuari says he has no plans to attack Sabah but wants the International Court of Justice to settle the status of Sabah if Malaysia will not resolve the issue with the Bangsamoro “justly and peacefully.”
In his 68-minute “State of the Bangsamoro Republik address” Misuari told thousands of supporters at the parade grounds of the Rizal Memorial Colleges (RMC) that he was informed word had gone around in Malaysia that with his release, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) would invade Sabah.
“Did I ask you to make war or peace?” Misuari asked. The crowd said no.
“Your shouts give lie to all these accusations,” he said.
MNLF organizers placed the crowd at 30,000 although the city government on Friday had placed the number of unarmed MNLF members who arrived here from various parts of Mindanao, at 5,000.
Misuari, however, challenged the Malaysia to show proof that Sabah is theirs.
He said the Sabah issue should be brought to the International Court of Justice for resolution.
“We have plenty of brave lawyers who are ready to face them because Sabah belongs to us,” Misuari said.
One of the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu, had also spoken earlier onstage.
Misuari cited what he called “the pittance,” in reference to the lease Sabah pays the Sultan’s heirs, at 5,000 ringgit or about 27,000 Philippine pesos.
“What are we going to do? Anong gagawin natin kung ayaw nila magbayad more than 5,000 ringgits” he asked.
“Five thousand ringgits. That’s a pittance,” he repeated.
Misuari was arrested in an island off Sabah on November 24, 2001 for alleged illegal entry. Hew was turned over to the Philippine government on January 7, 2002, and was detained on charges of rebellion until he was allowed to post bail on April 25 this year, after payment of P50,000 bond. (MindaNews)
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Malaysia Not An Honest Broker
The quest for an honest broker
By Manuel L. Quezon III
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 01:45:00 05/08/2008
MANILA, Philippines—Our traditional allies in the Mindanao peace process are Indonesia and Libya, Muslim nations that, however, have long established ties of friendship (in the case of Indonesia) and an appreciation of the secular framework of our republic (in the case of Libya). Our traditional antagonist, on the other hand, is Malaysia, whose birth as a nation the Philippines and Indonesia opposed because of the two nation’s claims on parts of North Borneo.
The Sabah question led the Philippines to support Indonesia’s policy of Konfrontasi with Malaysia, and the botched effort by the Marcos administration to provoke Sabah’s secession from Malaysia led, in turn, to Malaysian support for the Moro secessionist movement.
When Libya brokered a peace deal during the Marcos years with the Moro National Liberation Front, Malaysia lost a useful instrument to keep the Philippine government busy fighting secessionists at home, which prevented a revival of Philippine efforts to annex Sabah.
But then a split took place within the Moro nationalist ranks. Another bloc emerged, organized along Islamic lines: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). And so, the Philippine government has had to pursue the peace process in Mindanao on two fronts: with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which has obtained observer status in the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), and with the MILF, which has been less successful in obtaining a similar level of recognition from the OIC.
This provided an opportunity for Malaysia—and helps explain the closeness between the MILF and the Malaysian government. MILF chief peace negotiator Mohagher Iqbal told Newsbreak that as far as his organization is concerned, Malaysia is “irreplaceable” and “a vital partner.”
Some years back, in “The GRP-MILF Peace Talks: Quo Vadis?”, political science professor Rizal G. Buendia wrote: “While the MILF is currently engaged in peace negotiations as the only ‘peaceful, civilized, and democratic way of solving the Bangsamoro problem,’ it repeatedly emphasizes that independence is the main agenda and framework for the formal talks. ‘There is no point to proceed if the negotiations will not lead to independence,’ declared the MILF negotiators. The sustained effort towards gathering popular support for a UN- and OIC-supervised referendum, following the East Timor (now Timor-Leste) case, is a move to achieve independence using the institution and process of democracy. For the MILF, the conduct of a referendum is one of the options or mechanisms that it can utilize outside of the peace talks. It is the exercise of the ‘plebiscitary right to secede.’”
Viewed from the perspective of the Philippines’ traditional allies in the peace process—Indonesia and Libya—it is interesting to note that the MILF sees no reason to introduce Indonesia as a facilitator in the ongoing peace talks as a substitute for Malaysia. The closeness of the MILF to Malaysian authorities has obviously influenced this view, because Malaysia is wary of Indonesia, whose Kalimantan provinces comprise the largest portion of Borneo.
And Malaysia itself has demonstrated that it prefers to monopolize dealings with the MILF. It rejected the idea that USIP, an American federal institution, get involved in the negotiations between the government of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF. Cultivating the MILF prevents Malaysia from being frozen out of any potential resolution of the decades-old Moro rebellion in Mindanao.
Malaysia’s national interest requires that its ultimate aim be the protection of its sovereignty over Sabah, with its vast natural resources and relatively low population. It is not in Malaysia’s interest to have a situation where peace is established, if it results in a Moro government that is not friendly to Malaysia, or at least susceptible to its influence.
Just recently, the Malaysian government announced that another part of Borneo, Sarawak (which adjoins Sabah), has been identified as the country’s future rice bowl. The Asia Sentinel reports that nearly half of Sarawak’s territory has been earmarked for transformation into rice paddies. Malaysia’s vital strategic interest in protecting its Borneo territories has therefore increased, adding the dimension of food security.
A buffer zone, composed of an autonomous Muslim Mindanao region where the influence of the Philippine government can be held at bay, is what serves Malaysia’s interests, and not necessarily peace. Malaysia will support peace talks if their objective is in harmony with that country’s self-interest: any deviation from that, and Malaysia would much rather keep things in a state of perpetual negotiation. This means that if it needs to, in a sense, shake things up by diplomatic posturing, it will do so, regardless of how this affects the Philippines.
Malaysia has announced that it is prepared to withdraw from the GRP-MILF peace process. This has jolted our government into frantically appealing to Malaysia to stay involved, an appeal echoed by the MILF, for obvious reasons: the MILF’s ultimate ace in the hole is the threat of resuming active hostilities; Malaysia’s card is that ditching the peace process will confront the Philippine government with a resumption of fighting, which complicates its relationship with the United States, and ongoing efforts to develop Mindanao.
It’s well worth pondering, at this point, that the advantages Malaysia and the MILF enjoy at present is entirely the doing of our government. The Philippines brought Malaysia into the peace process; it contributed to strengthening the MILF’s bargaining position by accepting that Malaysia would serve as the MILF’s patron in the peace talks. Our government, in trying to please everyone, pleases no one and hasn’t brought peace any closer after several years of increasing Malaysian influence in the peace talks.
By Manuel L. Quezon III
Philippine Daily Inquirer
First Posted 01:45:00 05/08/2008
MANILA, Philippines—Our traditional allies in the Mindanao peace process are Indonesia and Libya, Muslim nations that, however, have long established ties of friendship (in the case of Indonesia) and an appreciation of the secular framework of our republic (in the case of Libya). Our traditional antagonist, on the other hand, is Malaysia, whose birth as a nation the Philippines and Indonesia opposed because of the two nation’s claims on parts of North Borneo.
The Sabah question led the Philippines to support Indonesia’s policy of Konfrontasi with Malaysia, and the botched effort by the Marcos administration to provoke Sabah’s secession from Malaysia led, in turn, to Malaysian support for the Moro secessionist movement.
When Libya brokered a peace deal during the Marcos years with the Moro National Liberation Front, Malaysia lost a useful instrument to keep the Philippine government busy fighting secessionists at home, which prevented a revival of Philippine efforts to annex Sabah.
But then a split took place within the Moro nationalist ranks. Another bloc emerged, organized along Islamic lines: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). And so, the Philippine government has had to pursue the peace process in Mindanao on two fronts: with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which has obtained observer status in the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), and with the MILF, which has been less successful in obtaining a similar level of recognition from the OIC.
This provided an opportunity for Malaysia—and helps explain the closeness between the MILF and the Malaysian government. MILF chief peace negotiator Mohagher Iqbal told Newsbreak that as far as his organization is concerned, Malaysia is “irreplaceable” and “a vital partner.”
Some years back, in “The GRP-MILF Peace Talks: Quo Vadis?”, political science professor Rizal G. Buendia wrote: “While the MILF is currently engaged in peace negotiations as the only ‘peaceful, civilized, and democratic way of solving the Bangsamoro problem,’ it repeatedly emphasizes that independence is the main agenda and framework for the formal talks. ‘There is no point to proceed if the negotiations will not lead to independence,’ declared the MILF negotiators. The sustained effort towards gathering popular support for a UN- and OIC-supervised referendum, following the East Timor (now Timor-Leste) case, is a move to achieve independence using the institution and process of democracy. For the MILF, the conduct of a referendum is one of the options or mechanisms that it can utilize outside of the peace talks. It is the exercise of the ‘plebiscitary right to secede.’”
Viewed from the perspective of the Philippines’ traditional allies in the peace process—Indonesia and Libya—it is interesting to note that the MILF sees no reason to introduce Indonesia as a facilitator in the ongoing peace talks as a substitute for Malaysia. The closeness of the MILF to Malaysian authorities has obviously influenced this view, because Malaysia is wary of Indonesia, whose Kalimantan provinces comprise the largest portion of Borneo.
And Malaysia itself has demonstrated that it prefers to monopolize dealings with the MILF. It rejected the idea that USIP, an American federal institution, get involved in the negotiations between the government of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF. Cultivating the MILF prevents Malaysia from being frozen out of any potential resolution of the decades-old Moro rebellion in Mindanao.
Malaysia’s national interest requires that its ultimate aim be the protection of its sovereignty over Sabah, with its vast natural resources and relatively low population. It is not in Malaysia’s interest to have a situation where peace is established, if it results in a Moro government that is not friendly to Malaysia, or at least susceptible to its influence.
Just recently, the Malaysian government announced that another part of Borneo, Sarawak (which adjoins Sabah), has been identified as the country’s future rice bowl. The Asia Sentinel reports that nearly half of Sarawak’s territory has been earmarked for transformation into rice paddies. Malaysia’s vital strategic interest in protecting its Borneo territories has therefore increased, adding the dimension of food security.
A buffer zone, composed of an autonomous Muslim Mindanao region where the influence of the Philippine government can be held at bay, is what serves Malaysia’s interests, and not necessarily peace. Malaysia will support peace talks if their objective is in harmony with that country’s self-interest: any deviation from that, and Malaysia would much rather keep things in a state of perpetual negotiation. This means that if it needs to, in a sense, shake things up by diplomatic posturing, it will do so, regardless of how this affects the Philippines.
Malaysia has announced that it is prepared to withdraw from the GRP-MILF peace process. This has jolted our government into frantically appealing to Malaysia to stay involved, an appeal echoed by the MILF, for obvious reasons: the MILF’s ultimate ace in the hole is the threat of resuming active hostilities; Malaysia’s card is that ditching the peace process will confront the Philippine government with a resumption of fighting, which complicates its relationship with the United States, and ongoing efforts to develop Mindanao.
It’s well worth pondering, at this point, that the advantages Malaysia and the MILF enjoy at present is entirely the doing of our government. The Philippines brought Malaysia into the peace process; it contributed to strengthening the MILF’s bargaining position by accepting that Malaysia would serve as the MILF’s patron in the peace talks. Our government, in trying to please everyone, pleases no one and hasn’t brought peace any closer after several years of increasing Malaysian influence in the peace talks.
Tuesday, May 6, 2008
Malaysia Peace Talks Pullout Linked to Sabah Claim?
Malaysia Peace Talks Pullout Linked to Sabah Claim?
Originally posted at wordpress.com by midfield
Is the reported Malaysian decision to “quit” the Mindanao peace talks and pull out its 41 peace keepers talks linked to the issue of the Philippine’s’ long-standing claim to North Borneo, known as the Malaysian State of Sabah?
We cannot help but raise this question, given that the Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah has now launched a website asserting its claim, http://www.royalsulu.com/issues.html. There is also a revealing report made by Al Jazeera television that “as many as eight people are claiming to be the “legitimate” Sultan of Sulu and Sabah. Here’s the YouTube link to the report: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bVwErDFfRno”
Former U. P. College of Law dean Merlin Magallona reports that “The present Baseline Law, Republic Act No. 3046 of 1961, was amended by Republic Act No. 5446 of 1968. Section 2 of the present Baseline Law provides that “The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act [Rep. Act No. 5446] is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis added).
But despite this clear mandate of the law ,Dean Magallona notes that “House Bill No. 3216 (with Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco as principal author) and its counterpart in the Senate (S. No. 1467, with Senator Trillanes as principal author) has deliberately eliminated Section 2 of Rep. Act. No. 5446 in reference to Philippine sovereignty over Sabah, as shown in the deliberations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 20 November 2007.”
The eminent professor, and acknowledged expert on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) warns that “in effect, if the Cuenco bill would be enacted into law, it would operate as repeal of the Sabah provision of the present Baseline Law. It would easily be interpreted as an abdication of Sabah as part of Philippine territory.”
Magallona goes on to reveal that “In place of the Sabah provision, the Cuenco Bill contains a “without prejudice clause” which provides: “The delineation of baselines as provided in this Act shall be without prejudice to any claims to any contested portions of the national territory or maritime zones and jurisdictions of the Philippines in accordance with international law and under appropriate international dispute resolution mechanisms.” (Emphasis added)
According to Dean Magallona “the clear and disastrous implication of the Cuenco bill is that it radically changed the status of Sabah in reference to the interest of the Republic from the unequivocal affirmation of Philippine sovereignty and dominion over Sabah under the present Baseline La wto a mere statement of claim to a contested portion of the national territory to be settled by some international dispute resolution mechanism under the Cuenco bill, resulting in the derogation of Philippine sovereignty over Sabah.”
Magallona, a former undersecretary in the Dept. of Foreign Affairs, “the present Baseline Law is the only articulation of Philippine sovereignty over Sabah by legislative will.”
“It is the only authoritative pronouncement of territorial sovereignty of the Philippines with respect to Sabah, “ Magallogna points out
“So much so that when the Philippines presented oral arguments before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Application for Permission to Intervene in the Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan between Malaya and Indonesia in 2001, it relied crucially on Section 2 of Republic Act No. 5446, as quoted above.”
“Even as the Philippines did not succeed in its intervention, the ICJ made it clear in its judgment that “it remains cognizant of the position stated by … the Philippines in the present proceedings,” according the the international law expert.
For the first time ever, on account of this intervention case, “the Philippine sovereignty over Sabah was demonstrated in the proceedings of the highest tribunal of the international community based inter alia on the strength of legislative proclamation of the Republic’s sovereignty over Sabah as provided in the present Baseline Law, which the Cuenco Bill now seeks to repudiate.”
It is a historical fact that North Borneo had been ‘leased in perpetuity’ by the Sultanate of Sulu to the British East India Company which then turned over the territory when the Federation of Malaya was formed in 1963. Such action has been described by the heirs of Sultan Jamalul Kiram as a blatant violation of the terms of the lease.
While Malaysian has effectively retained full control over Sabah, it is also on record that as recent as 2003 it has been paying “cession” fees to the Sultanate, based on notices transmitted by the Malaysian embassy in Manila. It is also asserted that under international law that the term ‘perpetuity’ is reckoned legally as lasting a period of 99 years. If this is so, then simple arithmetic would indicate that the lease has, in fact, expired. (At least one account on the Internet indicates the lease is 130 years past due.)
The website of the Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah asserts that at the very least, with Malaysia supposedly earning up to 100 billion dollars per year from the exploitation of the area’s rich natural resources (this figure is unverified), the sultanate would, by its own estimates, be entitled to a share of some 10 billion dollars, a huge amount the the sultanate says could go to uplifting the lives of the people of Sulu.
Draw your conclusions.
Originally posted at wordpress.com by midfield
Is the reported Malaysian decision to “quit” the Mindanao peace talks and pull out its 41 peace keepers talks linked to the issue of the Philippine’s’ long-standing claim to North Borneo, known as the Malaysian State of Sabah?
We cannot help but raise this question, given that the Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah has now launched a website asserting its claim, http://www.royalsulu.com/issues.html. There is also a revealing report made by Al Jazeera television that “as many as eight people are claiming to be the “legitimate” Sultan of Sulu and Sabah. Here’s the YouTube link to the report: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bVwErDFfRno”
Former U. P. College of Law dean Merlin Magallona reports that “The present Baseline Law, Republic Act No. 3046 of 1961, was amended by Republic Act No. 5446 of 1968. Section 2 of the present Baseline Law provides that “The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act [Rep. Act No. 5446] is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis added).
But despite this clear mandate of the law ,Dean Magallona notes that “House Bill No. 3216 (with Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco as principal author) and its counterpart in the Senate (S. No. 1467, with Senator Trillanes as principal author) has deliberately eliminated Section 2 of Rep. Act. No. 5446 in reference to Philippine sovereignty over Sabah, as shown in the deliberations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 20 November 2007.”
The eminent professor, and acknowledged expert on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) warns that “in effect, if the Cuenco bill would be enacted into law, it would operate as repeal of the Sabah provision of the present Baseline Law. It would easily be interpreted as an abdication of Sabah as part of Philippine territory.”
Magallona goes on to reveal that “In place of the Sabah provision, the Cuenco Bill contains a “without prejudice clause” which provides: “The delineation of baselines as provided in this Act shall be without prejudice to any claims to any contested portions of the national territory or maritime zones and jurisdictions of the Philippines in accordance with international law and under appropriate international dispute resolution mechanisms.” (Emphasis added)
According to Dean Magallona “the clear and disastrous implication of the Cuenco bill is that it radically changed the status of Sabah in reference to the interest of the Republic from the unequivocal affirmation of Philippine sovereignty and dominion over Sabah under the present Baseline La wto a mere statement of claim to a contested portion of the national territory to be settled by some international dispute resolution mechanism under the Cuenco bill, resulting in the derogation of Philippine sovereignty over Sabah.”
Magallona, a former undersecretary in the Dept. of Foreign Affairs, “the present Baseline Law is the only articulation of Philippine sovereignty over Sabah by legislative will.”
“It is the only authoritative pronouncement of territorial sovereignty of the Philippines with respect to Sabah, “ Magallogna points out
“So much so that when the Philippines presented oral arguments before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Application for Permission to Intervene in the Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan between Malaya and Indonesia in 2001, it relied crucially on Section 2 of Republic Act No. 5446, as quoted above.”
“Even as the Philippines did not succeed in its intervention, the ICJ made it clear in its judgment that “it remains cognizant of the position stated by … the Philippines in the present proceedings,” according the the international law expert.
For the first time ever, on account of this intervention case, “the Philippine sovereignty over Sabah was demonstrated in the proceedings of the highest tribunal of the international community based inter alia on the strength of legislative proclamation of the Republic’s sovereignty over Sabah as provided in the present Baseline Law, which the Cuenco Bill now seeks to repudiate.”
It is a historical fact that North Borneo had been ‘leased in perpetuity’ by the Sultanate of Sulu to the British East India Company which then turned over the territory when the Federation of Malaya was formed in 1963. Such action has been described by the heirs of Sultan Jamalul Kiram as a blatant violation of the terms of the lease.
While Malaysian has effectively retained full control over Sabah, it is also on record that as recent as 2003 it has been paying “cession” fees to the Sultanate, based on notices transmitted by the Malaysian embassy in Manila. It is also asserted that under international law that the term ‘perpetuity’ is reckoned legally as lasting a period of 99 years. If this is so, then simple arithmetic would indicate that the lease has, in fact, expired. (At least one account on the Internet indicates the lease is 130 years past due.)
The website of the Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah asserts that at the very least, with Malaysia supposedly earning up to 100 billion dollars per year from the exploitation of the area’s rich natural resources (this figure is unverified), the sultanate would, by its own estimates, be entitled to a share of some 10 billion dollars, a huge amount the the sultanate says could go to uplifting the lives of the people of Sulu.
Draw your conclusions.
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